A holdup problem on workers' skill investment can arise when employers adopt discriminatory hiring norm to extract higher than socially optimal prot. When hiring priority is determined by both productivity-dependent (skill level) and -independent characteristics (discrimination), skill investment decision becomes strategic between the discriminated and favored group. We consider frictional markets with either posted or bargained wage (xed sharing rule). With posted wage, depending on market tightness there may be equilibrium or multiple equilibria on skill investment. With discriminatory hiring, if in equilibrium both groups stay high skilled, both are worse o and rms better o; In any equilibrium where one group underinvest, the other group remain high skilled and are better o, while rms are worse o with discrimination. With bargained wage, similar equilibrium where the favored group underinvest exists, and rms incur cost for an intermediate range of bargaining power when they discriminate. JEL Classications: J7, J42
Introduction
A holdup problem arises when some investment is sunk ex ante by one party, and the payo is shared with that one party's trading partner. Since cost has no other use once sunk, that trading partner will have every incentive to squeeze the prot at the ex post stage. In an important study on such a problem in a labor market with search friction, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b) show that with rms' sinking capital and ex post wage bargaining, the equilibrium is always inecient, since wages paid ex post can be so high such that rms' ex ante incentive of investment is harmed; while if rms are able to post wages to direct workers' search, then the holdup problem to rms' investment no longer appears; the eciency can be achieved, because wage posting allows workers to observe oers and choose where to apply, and it induces workers to optimize their expected payo from application by making trade-o between every wage they observe and the probability of obtaining it. Within conventional wage posting framework, we spot another source of ineciency in a holdup problem where workers sink skill investment cost: when the market is crowded for the rms, by adopting a discriminatory hiring norm rms are able to expropriate higher than socially optimal level of prot, and this has the consequence of discouraging the investment incentives for both the favored and discriminated groups. We analyze the impact of such rent seeking behavior of rms on the structure of market segmentation, and on the workers' skill investment incentives.
When discrimination is absent, the wage posting economy with workers' ex ante skill investment attains eciency in the equilibria, and we show which equilibrium emerges depends on the rivalry between the log return to skill and the market tightness (workers/rms ratio) which measures the degree of market competition. The fundamental reason behind this eciency result is that skill achievement is a quality which can be legally written into the wage contracts. It is a dierent story when other (binary) characteristics which are not closely related to productivity, such as gender, race, height, origin etc. enter also into rms' preference.
Under equal pay legislation, posted wages can not be conditioned explicitly on these characteristics; however, if rms still select workers according to their preference on these characteristics, a separating equilibrium can result where separate rms post dierent levels of wages, and workers of dierent groups sort themselves and apply to dierent wages: the market is then endogenously segregated. On the side of rms, they have incentive to adopt such discriminatory hiring norm, when workers' return to skill investment is suciently high; in that case discrimination allows them to grasp higher than the socially optimal level of operating prot. On the side of the workers, it proves that both the discriminated group and favored group are worse o: for the former, it is because discrimination discretely reduces the labor market opportunity of these workers, who anticipate discrimination, then demand lower wages, which makes them cheaper to hire; for the latter, it is so because when rms are able to hire the discriminated workers cheaply, it is as if rms enjoy larger market power, which allows them to suppress further the undiscriminated workers' expected payo. Naturally, anticipating discrimination, all groups expect lower payo from search, jeopardizing their skill investment incentives.
A key feature of our study is the multidimensionality of characteristics based on which workers are ranked. On one hand, there is ranking by productivity-dependent type identity: workers are either high skilled (type H) or low skilled (type L); high skilled have priority to low skilled simply because such ranking gives rms higher prot. On the other hand, there is ranking by productivity-independent group identity:
workers belong either to the favored (group a) or the discriminated group (group b). The resulting ranking schedule has the following order: aH bH aL bL. It reads: given any skill level, group a are preferred to group b; the high skilled are always preferred to low skilled. Under such an intertwined ranking order, the skill investment decision for dierent groups becomes strategically interdependent. Focusing on Nash 2 Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.02 pure strategy equilibrium on skill investment, in the wage posting economy, we nd that depending on the value of market tightness there can be equilibrium or multiple equilibria on skill investment due to that interdependence. Compared to the case without discrimination, when the market is very crowded (market tightness is small) for the rms, discrimination is protable for rms and all the workers are worse o;
as the tightness further increases, both group can choose low skill and in equilibrium whenever one group underinvest, the other group remain high skilled and are better o, while the rms are worse o with discrimination. In particular, the equilibrium where the favored group underinvest, while the discriminated group choose to remain high skilled exists; And in this case rms' prots drop since workers' underinvestment in skill leads to lower average productivity in the economy compared to the case where discrimination is absent.
In the economy where wages are bargained (determined according to a xed sharing rule) after matching hence do not direct search, we nd similar equilibrium where the favored group underinvest, hence earn lower expected payo compared to the case without discrimination within a certain region of bargaining power; in such an equilibrium, surplus is transferred from rms and favored group to discriminated group. Firms' prots are piecewise monotone, because increase of workers' bargaining power can increase workers' incentive of skill investment, hence discretely improves the market skill composition and average productivity. We also nd that there is an intermediate range of workers' bargaining power for values of which rms are worse o by discriminating, due to discouraged skill investment from discriminated group. All in all, the key dierence between wage posting and wage bargaining is that the actual wage now exogenously pegs on the productivity, and rms can no longer manipulate their market power by translating their discriminatory preference into constantly lower wages.
Relation to the literature
Job search process is an important channel through which discrimination keeps functioning in the labor market. Several papers have highlighted the impact of discrimination through job search channel to the wages gaps. To name a few, Pendakur and Woodcock (2010) show that the existent glass ceilings for the immigrant and minority workers may be attributed by large measure to their poor access to the jobs in high-wage rms; As well, in an important article from Ritter and Taylor (2011) , they show that most of the disparity in unemployment rate could not be explained by cognitive skills that emerge at an early stage, although for wage gap it could be the case. This result concerning the unemployment disparity is conrmed by the nding that this disparity is still signicant even for workers of similar skill levels.
Our work is most closely related to the directed search literature 1 . In this literature, search frictions are derived endogenously through agents' sequential strategic interactions. Taking into account strategic interaction allows search externality to be internalized. The resulting economy remains competitive, albeit with a non-Walrasian market structure, and prices play an allocative role to achieve eciency. To the best of our knowledge, among the discrimination literature with search friction, only two of them are built upon wage posting context. Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005, hereafter LMD) show that a discriminatory hiring rule could lead to labor market segmentation and signicant wage gap with even a negligible dierence in productivity; however, the discriminated group turn out to have lower unemployment rate, which is in sharp contrast with evidence. Merlino (2012) pre-matching investment from the rms' side, and obtain technology dispersion and realistic unemployment gap. His results rely on the strong assumption that there is more discrimination in the high technology sector, and he is silent on the workers' skill levels. Our paper diers from theirs, in that our focus is to analyze how hiring discrimination could distort workers' skill investment incentives and the structure of market segmentation.
While the setup of wage bargaining (no information of level of wage before matching) is more prevalent, it neglects an important trade-o that the workers make to some extent in their search for jobs: the wage and the probability of obtaining it. This endogenous link between wage and employment probability is especially important, since wages convey information on whether the employers discriminate. Having information of wages available before matching, workers are able to adjust accordingly their search strategy to avoid being discriminated. Workers apply to certain wage only when their expected payo (wage times the employment probability) from this application attains certain level, and a high wage which attracts also the favored group discretely lowers the probability of employment for the discriminated group to such an extent that the expected payo for the latter at these high wage rms does not meet the expected market payo. This setup is supported by Lang and Lehmann (2012) and Heckman (1998) , who mention that workers do not apply randomly and they actually avoid prejudiced employers to some extent, which implies between-group search externality is taken into account by the discriminated workers. Moreover, it is well known that withingroup search externality may be prevalent when wages are bargained; while in wage posting context, we are able to abstract from search externality and focus on discrimination. Hall and Krueger (2010) use U.S. data to show that fraction of posted and bargained wages are both around one third. They also document a negative relationship between the education level and precise information concerning the expected pay.
Brenzel, Gartner and Shnabel (2013) focus on the employer's side of the study in Germany, and show that around two thirds of the wages are posted, and the bargained wages are more likely set for those with higher education and qualication. The message is that not only is wage posting a prevalent wage determination process in the labor market, more importantly, it is also dominant in the relatively low skilled sector.
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Within our context, employers can not post wages contingent on workers' group identity which is irrelevant to productivity, which could be understood as due to the functioning of the equal opportunity legislation.
Literature addressing discrimination problem in random search context is vaster. However, to have tractable such model convenient for linking to evidence, the introduced discrimination is usually taste-based, hence to obtain realistic outcome may often require making compromise on assuming ex ante dierences in parameters governing relevant characteristics. Rosen (1997) is an exception and shows that discrimination can result even if there are no dierences across groups. Job opportunities arrive stochastically, minority workers choose reservation productivities above which they accept the job; To avoid majority workers who are always preferred, they choose to accept jobs even with low reservation wages. Although private information is the key element in Rosen (1997)'s model, search externality remains the main channel for the functioning of the discrimination mechanism. Our focus is on how the ranking order of rms contributes to strategic interdependence in workers' skill investment decisions, and search externality is internalized when search is directed.
There is also the important statistical discrimination literature 3 which emphasizes the role of asymmetric information on qualities related to the productivity. One strand of this literature derives group inequalities 2 It is consistent with our knowledge that the more skilled workers, whose number is comparatively small, usually receive more attention and protections. endogenously even in the absence of ex ante group dierence on relevant characteristics. Their mechanism is that decision makers' asymmetric beliefs on relevant characteristics of members for dierent groups could subsequently dim unfavored agents' incentive on investment on payo-relevant technology, which in turn justies the rms initial beliefs. Our context is dierent from this literature mainly in the point that, instead of relying on the information friction which plays central role in generating the pessimistic outcome, we work through a sequential game where agents could correctly anticipate the pessimistic outcomes, hence choose to react accordingly in a rational way.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the case without discrimination. We then move to the economy with discrimination in Section 3. In section 4, we consider the case of wage bargaining. Section 5 discusses, and then we conclude.
The model without discrimination
We start with a context without hiring discrimination. Consider an economy populated by two kinds of agents, the workers and the rms. The number of workers is N , 4 with the index i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }, and the number of rms is M , with the index j ∈ {1, 2, ..., M }. Dene the market tightness as β ≡ N M .
We introduce a pre-matching investment stage in a standard wage posting game. Each job seeker makes a skill investment decision before entering into the labor market. This skill choice is assumed to be binary, such that if the worker decides to become highly skilled, an investment cost E H is paid, and otherwise E L , with E H > E L . A highly skilled job seeker who pays E H is capable of producing y H ; while a low skilled could only deliver y L . It would be useful to understand the formulation in the following way: workers who enter labor market after a longer period of training at school expect to receive higher expected income compared to those who spend a shorter period in schooling and enter the market at an earlier stage; the opportunity cost for the former is E H , and for the latter is E L . We assume that workers' skill level is public information. The costs {E L , E H } and productivities {y L , y H } are exogenous, but should satisfy some conditions which will be specied later.
Firms are ex ante identical. Having observed the distribution of skill attainment of job seekers, they post wages conditional on skills. If rms choose to attract a high skilled worker, they post w H , and the surplus after matching is y H − w H ; in case a low-skilled worker is searched for, w L is announced and the surplus is y L − w L . We emphasize that skill is a characteristic of workers which the wage contracts can be conditioned on; this is in sharp contrast to other qualities such as gender, race, height etc. which, under equal pay legislation, should not be conditioned on; so when rms distinguish workers according to these latter qualities, the wage contract becomes incomplete; 5 by this, we will say that rms discriminate.
The timing follows that of a standard wage posting game, augmented by a pre-matching skill investment stage (Stage 0):
Stage 0: Workers choose skill level, and pay either E H or E L . Stage 1: Firms observe skills of job seekers, and announce the wage (w L , w H ).
Stage 2: Workers observe the wages oers, and choose which wage to apply to. Stage 3: Firms select workers from the received applications, and they select workers with same skill levels with equal probability. Then the production is carried on, and payos are realized.
We will focus on subgame perfect equilibria. Firms choose wages to maximize prots, and workers choose rstly the skill level and then which wage to apply to, in order to maximize the expected payo from search.
Specication of the Strategies, matching probabilities, and payo functions
To write agents' payos, it is a routine procedure in the directed search literature to rst derive the matching functions. This section provides a quick summary for the general understanding of the context. Dene a type-t job seeker i's strategy as a vector of probabilities
where θ ij t is the probability with which the type-t worker i applies to rm j, and t ∈ {L, H}. It holds that j θ ij t = 1 for any i and t. As in the literature, it is convenient 6 to proceed with a transformation of variable. We dene q, as expected number of applications received per rm; it is also called the expected queue length.
Denote q j as the queue length of rm j, and q j t as the queue length of the type-t workers in rm j. If a rm attracts both high and low skilled, we have q j = q j L + q j H , where q j L and q j H are the queue length of the corresponding workers in rm j. Since we only consider symmetric equilibria, for a given rm j, θ ij t has the same value for any type t job seeker, so we denote θ ij L = θ j L and θ ij H = θ j H for any j. is the probability of receiving at least one application from type t workers. According to the aboved dened relationship q j t = N t θ j t , the probability
This probability is increasing in q, which means that the more the expected number of applicants, the higher the probability that the rm could ll the vacancy. The rm chooses wage to maximize their expected prot, which is the product of the probability of meeting a worker of this type and the net surplus,
where y t ∈ {H, L}. In the following we may occasionally suppress the superscript j whenever it does not raise confusion.
As shown by Shi (2006) , in case workers of both skill levels appear in the market, it is optimal for rms to post both w L and w H to attract both skill types. Furthermore, rms rank the high skilled in priority to the low skilled, that is, rms will only consider hiring the low skilled workers when they did not receive any application from high skilled workers, an event which happens with probability e −q H . Then the expected prot (from attracting both types of workers) is 6 When the number of rms and workers are large, it is no longer convenient to operate with the workers' application strategy θ j i , because it will tend to zero in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. 6 Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.02
Job seekers. Job seekers observe all the wages w announced by rms, and choose which wage to apply to. Consider a particular job seeker. Conditional on visiting a particular rm j, his probability of employment in that rm is
(see Appendix for more details). And these probabilities become
qt is decreasing in q t : the higher the expected number of applicants in this rm competing this job with him, the lower the probability with which this job seeker will be employed. Also notice that the employment probability of the low skilled workers is a product of e −q H and 1−e −q L q L , where the former governs the between-group competition eect, and 1−e −q L q L governs the within-group competition eect.
We remark that since q is a function of job seekers' application strategy, it depends on w. We now look more closely into their causal relationship. We should distinguish two terms: (1) each job seeker's expected payo from application, and (2) her expected market payo. The expected payo from application is the payo that a worker receives when applying to a certain rm, namely, a product of the wage and the probability of obtaining it at that rm, namely,
× w L for the low skilled. The expected market payo, denoted by U t , is the maximum level of the expected payo from application in the equilibrium. U t is regarded as an aggregate variable, which is assumed to be invariant with respect to any variation of an individual agent's strategy. Consider a particular type H job seeker. He is willing to send application to a particular rm j, if and only if his expected payo 1−e −q j H q j H × w j H from doing so is equal or greater than the expected market payo U H . By the denition that U H is the maximum
Job seekers make trade-o between the wage and the probability obtaining it. To highlight the dependence of q t on w t , we could rewrite the above expressions as
We now formalize the notion of equilibrium and will proceed in two steps. In the rst, we state the notion of equilibrium for the wage posting subgame given a skill distribution of workers. In the second, we distinguish two notions on how workers optimally choose their skill level. For the wage posting subgame, the solution concept will be standard subgame-perfect competitive equilibrium (SPCE) similar to LMD (2005). Now we turn to workers' skill decision which determines the value of α. Workers choose to be high skilled whenever U H − E H > U L − E L , then the fraction of high skilled workers is such that α = 1. Workers choose to be low skilled whenever U H − E H < U L − E L , then the fraction of high skilled workers is such that α = 0. Workers are indierent between high and low skill when U H − E H = U L − E L . In the case with indierence, we should make distinctions on two notions specied as follows:
• Notion 1 (perfect correlation): Whenever indierent, all workers (within a group) choose either high or low skilled.
• Notion 2 (no perfect correlation): Whenever indierent, α represents individual worker's probability of choosing to be high skilled.
Under Notion 1, all workers in one group, whenever indierent between two alternatives (L or H), will randomize towards the same direction: that is to say, we consider the group of workers as a whole, or there is perfect correlation on their skill choices; as a result, α does not represent an individual's probability of choosing high skilled and takes either the value 0 or 1, α ∈ {0, 1}. Under Notion 2, each worker can randomize between high and low skill whenever they are indierent; since each worker can end up either high or low skilled, after this randomization, high and low skilled workers can be present at the same time, in contrast to Notion 1; The equilibrium value of α, denoted by α * , will be endogenously determined by the indierence equation, in which case α * ∈ (0, 1).
In the following analysis in this section without discrimination, we will derive equilibrium under both notions because technically Notion 1 could be regarded as a subproblem of Notion 2. However, we will focus exclusively on the study under Notion 1 when we turn to the section with discrimination. By doing so, we are able to abstract from some equilibrium which only arises under theoretical rigor but at the same time yields insights to a limited extent and induces unnecessary complexity in analysis.
Solution of the wage posting subgame. According to Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) , the denition of equilibrium is equivalent to a problem where rms choose wages to maximize their expected prot, taking into account the best responses of other rms as well as of the job seekers. As we consider a large economy, in which a single rm's deviation does not alter the expected market payo U t , the market payo can be taken as given in the stage where a rm maximizes its prot, and will later be determined endogenously.
Thus, we consider the optimization problem in which a (deviating) rm j chooses w t with t ∈ {L, H} to maximize its expected prot, taking expected market payo U t (other rms' responses) and the functional relationship between w t and q t (job seekers' responses) as given. When the rm attracts a single skill type, max wt
for t ∈ {L, H}. For a given U t , solving w t from the constraint, substituting it into the objective function, and maximizing with respect to q t , we can obtain an optimal functional relationship between q * t and U t .
Using this obtained relationship, with the help of the constraint, we then achieve an optimal functional relationship between w * t and q * t . And since in symmetric equilibrium all rms will post the same wages, so that all workers will apply to each rm with equal probability, by denition of q we have q j (2006), the problem is
At last, it is important to remark that q t depends on w t continuously, as remarked by . In this way, a marginal change of wage w t can only lead to a marginal modication on the expected number of applicants q t . By the denition of q, under Notion 2, we have q *
Once the skill investment choice pins down the value of α * , we obtain q * H = α * β, and q * L = (1 − α * ) β. In the next section, we establish the decentralized market equilibrium and examine its properties. It is convenient to start with Notion 2.
Decentralized Market Equilibrium without discrimination under Notion 2
Firms' wage oers are conditioned on job seekers' skill levels, so we rst consider the skill investment decision of job seekers at rst stage. Denote α as the fraction of the job seekers who choose to invest in high skill, so the remaining fraction (1 − α) is low skilled. Under Notion 2, α is also the probability with which a job seeker chooses to invest in high skill, by virtue of the Law of Large Number. Let α * denote the equilibrium fraction of high skilled job seekers on the total population. There are three cases:
Case (1). α * = 1. All job seekers invest in high skill.
Case (2) . α * ∈ (0, 1). Some invest in high skill, while the remaining in low skill. Case (3) . α * = 0. All invest in low skill.
With Case (1) and Case (3), there exists only one skill level in the market, and since skills can be conditioned on wages, there is only one wage posted in equilibrium. However, the market with Case (2) features two skill levels. Shi (2006) establishes that in this case it is optimal for rms to attract both skill types, while ranking the high skilled in priority to the low skilled. We now show that the rivalry between the market competition (captured by market tightness β) and the magnitude of the return to skill ratio y H −y L E H −E L are crucial in the determination of which of the above three cases may prevail. Proposition 1. (return to skills) Given the return to skill ratio
(i) when 0 < β ≤β, the unique equilibrium is such that all job seekers choose high skill, i.e. α * = 1.
(ii) when β >β, the equilibrium consists of a unique value α * ∈ (0, 1) which satises
Proof. In the appendix.
When the value of return to skill
is suciently large compared to e β , which measures the intensity of competition of the market, job seekers nd it a dominant strategy to invest in high skills; There is no incentive for them to deviate, and the output is highest among all the equilibria. When the value of
is moderate, there exists an equilibrium where job seekers are indierent from being high skilled or low skills;
all rms nd it optimal to attract both skill types; the output is lower compared to the previous equilibrium.
At last, when the value of return to skill is suciently low, it does not provide them incentive to sink this xed cost against the risky job search game they are going to play; the equilibrium level of output turns out to be the lowest.
Decentralized Market Equilibrium without discrimination under Notion 1
Under Notion 1, there is only one skill type present in the market. When rms attract a single skill type, they solve max wt
In equilibrium, for the high skilled we have:
H y H , where q * H = β; and for the low skilled:
It turns out that the threshold which makes workers indierent is the same asβ established under Notion 2.
Constrained ecient allocations
The objective of this section is to nd the ecient allocations in the centralized market, and evaluate whether the decentralized market attains its eciency. The social planner maximizes the aggregate output,
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We use the superscript p to label the equilibrium allocation chosen by the planner. Let α be the fraction of high skilled workers the social planner chooses, α ∈ [0, 1]. If the optimal arrangement is α p = 1, all job seekers are high skilled, and only one type of rms exists -those which attract high skilled workers.
It is similar for α p = 0. If α p ∈ (0, 1), there are both high and low skilled job seekers and it is optimal for the planner to assign all rms to post wages for both the high and low skilled (shown in Shi (2006) ).
Furthermore, in the last case the planner can also manage the priority of rms' hiring workers with dierent skills -whether to prefer high skilled to low skilled or otherwise. Let R be the probability with which the rms rank high skilled workers in priority to the low skilled. And q t is the expected number of applicants in a rm, t ∈ {L, H}, which governs how the planner assigns workers' applications. Thus, the social planner's problem is to maximize the following aggregate output
If at least one high skilled visits a certain rm, with probability (1 − e −q H ), the rm hires this high skilled, either with probability 1 when no low skilled worker shows up, which happens with probability e −q L , or with probability R if there is at least one low skilled who shows up at the same rm, which occurs with probability (1 − e −q L ); it is similar for the case with low productivity. Since the rms and workers of the same skill are all identical from the planner's perspective, we have q H = αβ and q L = (1 − α) β. The above objective includes all cases with dierent values of α. Solving the problem, we can see that the optimal ranking is that rms always prefer high skilled workers, i.e., R p = 1, and we have the following proposition Proposition 2. The equilibrium labor allocation and skill investment choice are socially optimal.
Proof. In the Appendix.
In the proof, we could also verify that the thresholdβ p for skill investment coincides withβ in the decentralized economy. That is, when 0 < β ≤β = log y H −y L E H −E L , it is socially optimal that workers all invest in high skill; when β >β, it is socially optimal that a fraction α * of workers invest in high, while the rest invest in low skill; and y H −y L E H −E L ≤ 1 such thatβ has no positive real solution, all invest in low skill. In the rest of the paper, we mainly focus on the rst case, so that whenever workers are discouraged to underinvest, it is due to the eect of discrimination.
The model with hiring discrimination
We now introduce discrimination. Consider an economy where workers can be partitioned into two groups, group a and group b, according to certain trait which is irrelevant to productivity. Gender, for example, is such one possible binary partition of labor force. Denote the fraction of group a as γ, and the fraction of group b as 1 − γ. The two group of workers are ex ante identical in all other aspects. Discrimination modies the matching functions of agents. Specically, in order to formulate discrimination, we introduce a term x called hiring (ranking) rule specied by rms. To be precise, x could be understood as the probability with which the group a workers are selected when workers from both groups are present. The probability that a group a worker is employed by this rm is
Analogously, the probability that a group b worker is employed by this rm is
To understand these expressions, we have to notice that now when job seekers are considering their probability of being hired, they have to take into account of the impact from the competition with the other group. The parts 1−e −qa qa
capture the within group competition, while the remaining parts with
x capture the between group competition. When x = 1, rms hire group b workers only when none of the group a is present. Firms' preference is such that group a are preferred to group b, although both groups have identical productivity. This is what we call hiring discrimination. The employment probability for group a and group b workers become respectively,
Another interesting example is x = 1 2 . The employment probability for group a and group b workers becomes respectively F a q a , q b ,
2 , both workers have identical employment probability, and it is as if there is no discrimination among workers. Furthermore, we have F a (q a , q b , 1) ≥ F a q a , q b , 1 2 for any positive value of (q a , q b ). Then the employment probability of workers from the preferred group (group a) is higher under discrimination than that in the case without discrimination. Similarly, when F b (q a , q b , 1) ≤ F b q a , q b , 1 2 for any positive values of (q a , q b ), i.e. the employment probability of the discriminated group (group b) is lower when there is hiring discrimination. In fact, the employment probability of group a (group b) is increasing (decreasing) in x.Thus, for a given positive pair of (q a , q b ), there existsx ∈ (0, 1) such that F a (q a , q b ,x) = F b (q a , q b ,x), andx could be considered as the hiring rule without discrimination. Indeed x measures the intensity of rms' discriminatory preference. Given q a and q b , for x ∈ [0,x), rms discriminate group a, and for x ∈ (x, 1] rms discriminate against group b. The closer x approaches to the extremes of the interval [0, 1], the more intensive the hiring discrimination is. In the rest of paper, we focus on the case x = 1 such that group a achieve absolute priority to group b.
The case of strong discrimination: x = 1
Formally, we introduce two assumptions as in Merlino (2012) . These assumptions help introduce some heterogeneity which is not related to productivity among the labor pool.
Assumption 1: Firms are not allowed to post wages which are dependent on the group identity. Assumption 2: Firms prefer group a in the sense that rms only hire workers from group b when no group a workers are present, i.e. x = 1.
Same as the case without discrimination, workers visit a rm only when they can obtain the expect market payo from applying to that rm. We denote in this section the expected market payo of high skilled job seekers from group a and group b as U aH and U bH respectively. The above assumptions imply
For β ≤β, all workers choose to be high-skilled if there were no discrimination. To analyze how does discrimination have impact on workers' expected payo from search hence the skill investment incentives, it is important to rst study the wage posting subgame with discrimination given a skill distribution. Without loss of generality, we start with the case where both groups choose to be high skilled. In the next section, we review the results from LMD (2005), where they study the case with discrimination but no dierence in workers' skill levels (or productivity).
Existing results revisited and reinterpreted
In a context where there are two groups of workers with identical productivity (skill level) and rms strongly prefer group a to group b. LMD (2005) show that any subgame-perfect competitive equilibrium (SPCE) is separating.
Separating equilibrium. LMD (2005) show that there is no wage to which both groups of job seekers apply. More precisely, no wage can maximize rms' prot while attracting both groups of workers simultaneously (with the expected payo from application attaining the corresponding market payo ). The equilibrium is separating. That is, there are some rms posting a higher level of wage attracting only the preferred group a, whereas the rest of rms oering a lower wage which is applied only by the discriminated group b (see Proposition 2 in LMD (2005) ). Notice that the discriminated group have always the choice of applying to the high wage rms, however, they choose not to do so at all, because they anticipate discrimination in these rms. The most essential results of LMD (2005) are summarized as follows:
(i) At the rms attracting group a workers, expected prot for the rms and the expected payo for the workers in the equilibrium are ii) At the rms attracting group b workers, expected prot for the rms and the expected payo for the workers in the equilibrium are
Separating equilibrium requires that rms be indierent between attracting group a and group b workers, that is π S aH = π S bH which helps to determine q S bH and q S aH jointly. (iii) Furthermore, we have w S aH > w S bH . q S aH > β > q S bH , both q S aH and q S bH are increasing in β and γ, and both q S aH and q S bH are independent of y H .
We make some important remarks on the features of the separating equilibrium. Firstly, the resulted equilibrium allocations are incentive compatible. For any particular bH job seeker, by deviating to applying for w S aH , the best they can get is e −q S aH × w S aH (when none of the group a shows up in the rm which this bH worker deviates to apply to). However, this deviating payo is strictly lower than sticking to applying to w S bH owing to the following relationship:
As for any particular aH job seeker, by deviating to w S bH , the best they can get is w S bH = U S aH , which is as good as what he could get if he does not deviate. Secondly, we do not have the reservation wage structure.
A reservation wage structure requires that workers apply to any wage which gives them an expected payo higher than certain reservation value, in our case it would imply group bH should apply to both the low and high wages, however, it is not the case. This is because the expected payo from applying to the high wage is a strictly dominated strategy for group b: the expected payo from applying to high wages is too low to match their expected market payo U S bH . Following are several noteworthy properties of such an equilibrium. Group b workers are worse o, because of rms' discriminatory hiring norm. Anticipating discrimination, group b demand lower expected payo, which makes them cheaper to be employed. This in turn increases rms' market power in hiring group a. Group a understand that if they demand high wages, rms will threat to switch to hiring group b workers instead. Hence group a workers demand also low wages, and are worse o too. Now more about rms. Apart from the mechanisms just described, rms are able to earn high prots because in the regime with discrimination market is segmented, which allows the rms to face less competition in each segment. As a general remark, discrimination enables rms to extract higher prot by holding up job seekers' skill investment and providing all the job seekers lower expected payo. 14 Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.02 Furthermore, since U S aH > U S bH , it suggests that the group b job seekers, being discriminated, are hurt to a larger extent. So that group b' incentive of skill investment is distorted further downwards. We enter more detailed discussions in the following section.
Results

Analysis under our context
In the last section, we interpreted the equilibrium of the wage posting subgame given that all workers choose to be high skilled. In this section, we study how discrimination leads to dierent incentives of skill investment for these two groups respectively, and attempt to nd the corresponding equilibrium.
An important observation is that the skill decision for group a and group b is strategic, and this is a direct consequence of the coexistence of ranking through the productivity-dependent (skill) and -independent traits (discrimination). Ranking by skills requires that the high skilled workers have the priority; While ranking by productivity-independent traits means that group a have the priority. Although multidimensional characteristics are involved, these two ranking schedules yield a unique market hierarchy: aH bH aL bL . It reads as follows: high skilled group a (aH ) are preferred to high skilled group b (bH ), who are preferred to low skilled group a (aL), who are then preferred to low skilled group b (bL). How does the strategic interdependence arise? Take group a as an example for explanation. Although they are always ranked prior to group b due to discrimination, whenever they contemplate to lower skill investment, they understand that they will be ranked behind the high skilled group b; then the term e −q bH which captures the competition from bH will appear in their payos.
Given the strategic interdependence in payos from skill investment, we adopt Nash equilibrium as the solution concept for the skill investment game. We proceed under Notion 1, and regard a whole group as making decision collectively and simultaneously, then all the workers in one group either end up high or low skilled. And we will focus on pure strategy of each group. Let α g be the probability of group g's choosing to be high skilled, for g = a or b. We have either α g = 1 or α g = 0. We have the following four possibilities as equilibrium:
• (P1) α a = 1 and α b = 1: group a -high, group b -high • (P2) α a = 1 and α b = 0: group a -high, group b -low • (P3) α a = 0 and α b = 1: group a -low, group b -high
To decide the skill investment, workers take into account rms' best response in the wage posting stage to infer the expected payo from application, and compare the payos net of the cost of skill investment. In the wage posting subgame, when facing all workers with identical skill level (as in case (P1) and (P4)), rms' optimal strategy is the same as stated in LMD (2005); that is, some rms post a higher wage which is only applied by group a, whereas the rest post a lower wage which is only applied by group b. When there are both low and high skilled workers (as in case (P2) and (P3)), rms post wages conditional on skill level, and it is optimal for rms to attract both skill levels and rank the high skilled in priority to low skilled, as in Shi (2006) . We then proceed to nd workers' best response in the skill investment stage, and in turn 15 Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.02 the equilibrium in this discriminatory context with skill investment. We will use P1, P2, P3, P4 as the superscript for corresponding equilibrium allocations. When α a = 1 and α b = 1, workers are composed of type aH and bH. Firms post wages separately. We have the following payos for aH and bH respectively,
When α a = 1 and α b = 0, workers are composed of type aH and bL. Firms post wages conditional on skills, attract both types at the same time, and rank the high skilled in priority to the low skilled. As for the payos, we have A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium on skill investment consists of a prole of actions with the property that no single group as a whole can achieve a higher payo by unilateral deviation. The equilibrium depends on the value of β. For example, holding group a high skilled, when we decide whether group b choose to be high or low skill, we must compare U P 1 bH and U P 2
bL . And we nd that there exists at least one thresholdβ 2 which is determined by U P 1 bH = U P 2 bL and is such thatβ 2 <β; this implies that depending on dierent values of β, the group b may choose high or low skill, leading to potentially dierent equilibrium. For tractability, we should introduce the following two conditions which guarantee that any such threshold asβ 2 is unique:
The results on the equilibrium are summarized as follows:
Proposition 3: Under the above assumptions, there exist two thresholdsβ 2 andβ 1 with 0 <β 2 <β 1 <β, such that
(1) When 0 < β <β 2 , there exists a unique equilibrium in which both group a and group b invest in high skill, (aH, bH) . At β =β 2 , both (aH, bH) and (aH, bL) can be equilibrium.
(2) Whenβ 2 < β <β 1 , there exists a unique equilibrium in which group a invest in high skill while group b in low skill, (aH, bL). At β =β 1 , both (aL, bH) and (aH, bL) can be equilibrium.
(3) Whenβ 1 < β ≤β, there exist multiple equilibria. Either group a invest in high skill and group b in low skill, or group a invest in low skill and group b invest in high skill, (aL, bH) or (aH, bL).
In fact, if one group choose to be low skilled, the best response of the other group is always to be high skilled, while the best response to the other's high skill choice depends on the two thresholds. Furthermore, the rise of market tightness β makes workers have stronger incentive to deviate from high skill, and group b is more prone to deviate compared to group a, in the sense that the threshold of β at which group b begins to contemplate to invest in low skill is lower compared to group a. Interestingly, for values of β close tô β, there exists an equilibrium where the preferred group a choose low skill, while the discriminated group b choose high skill. We have the following results on the comparison of workers' expected payo and rms' prots compared to the case without discrimination.
Corollary. Compared to the case without discrimination, (1) In (aH, bH) equilibrium, rms always earn higher expected prots; In (aH, bL) equilibrium and (aL, bH), rms earn lower expected prots.
(2) In (aH, bH) equilibrium, both aH and bH workers earn lower expected payo; In (aH, bL) equilibrium, group aH (group bL) earn higher (lower) expected payo; in (aL, bH) equilibrium, group bH (group aL) earn higher (lower) expected payo.
This corollary tells that rms can be worse o with discrimination. Indeed, when workers anticipate discrimination, their investment incentive may be downwards distorted, and some group may end up choosing to underinvest. In equilibrium, whenever one group underinvest and the other group remain high skilled, the 9 When y H is suciently large compared to y L , these two conditions are satised. Takeβ rms turn out to earn lower expected prots compared to the case without discrimination. This is simply due to the fact that underinvestment in skills discretely drags down the average productivity of the economy.
Comparison with xed sharing rule (Wage Bargaining)
In this section, we shut down the channel through which rms use wages to inuence workers' choices on applications, and examine whether the ineciency can be alleviated. Notice that in this section, the workers only choose the amount of skills to obtain, not where to search.
Consider an economy with the same discriminatory ranking as previous, but the wage is determined by ex post bargaining after a job seeker meets an employer. The timing of the economy now is as follows:
rstly, workers decide skill levels simultaneously; secondly, workers and rms get matched according to the matching technology; thirdly, the matched worker-rm pair bargain à la Nash to determine how to share the output y. The simplest form of Nash bargaining widely used in literature is equivalent to a xed sharing rule of output. If we denote the bargaining power for all workers as ψ, then from the output y t , workers receive ψy t , and rms receive (1 − ψ) y t . We focus on the case where ψ is the same for both skill levels, otherwise there is too much degree of freedom.
For the ease of comparison, we require that the matching technology here is the same as in previous section. The hiring norm is as previous Group aH Group bH Group aL Group bL. The corresponding employment probability for dierent types of workers is inherited, so that the employment probability is × ψy L as the expected payo from search. Now, we specify the expected queue lengths q aH , q bH , q aL and q bL parametrically. Recall the denition of queue length is nb. of workers nb. of vacancies , then we have q aH = γη a β for aH workers, q bH = (1 − γ) η b β for bH workers, q aL = γ (1 − η a ) β for aL workers, and q bL = (1 − γ) (1 − η b ) β for bL workers, where η a represents the fraction of high skilled group a, and η b the fraction of high skilled group b. The values of η a and η b depend on the comparison between the expected payo from investing in high or low skill:
To keep consistency with the previous section (under Notion 1), we require that whenever indierent, the whole group will choose either high or low skill, so that η is either 0 or 1 in that case. We will also assume that the group a are the majority: γ ≥ 1 2 .
10
10 We think this case with γ ≥ 1 2 is more empirically relevant, when we are talking about gender and racial discrimination for example. The case γ < 1 2 could be also analogously derived according to the proof of the following proposition.
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We focus on Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. In the current context, only workers make skill investment decisions, rms do not post wages since ψ is exogenous. We consider each group, i.e. group a or group b, as a whole when they are making decisions. Each group of workers invest in skills simultaneously. Due to the discriminatory rule, the payos from skill investment for dierent groups of workers are interdependent. This renders the skill investment strategic. The following proposition helps explain how workers' expected payos vary with respect to ψ: Proof. In the Appendix.
It is not always true that the group a workers are always better o. Notably, there is an equilibrium similar as before where group a underinvest: It could be observed from the payo matrix (provided in the proof of Proposition 4) that in the region ψ ∈ ψ aL,b ,ψ bH,a group a (group b) workers obtain lower (higher) expected payo compared to the case without discrimination. This is also closely related to the fact that when γ ≥ 1 2 the within-group competition in group a is ercer. In general, rms' payo is written as follows:
According to Proposition 4, we can determine the exact values of the queue lengths in the expression.
Firms' prot will be piecewise monotone because although ψ increases continuously, the skill composition hence the average productivity of the market improves discretely with respect to this bargaining power. The fact thatψ bL,a <ψ <ψ aH,b suggests that although rms can gather higher prots for ψ <ψ, they encounter loss for ψ ≥ψ compared to the case without discrimination. The reason is that strategic competition between the group a and group b deters the discriminated group's skill investment decision (in the sense that group b may still choose to be low skilled when ψ is suciently high), which pulls down the market's average productivity and makes rms' expected prot dim.
It is interesting to notice that our simple result that discrimination is costly for rms at high skilled sector (when wages are bargained) questions the plausibility of key assumption of Merlino (2012) that there is more discrimination in the high technology sector. Although Merlino (2012) mentioned bunches 19 Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne -2016.02 of empirical evidence in support of this assumption 11 , our simple result suggest that rms are simply better o not discriminating when wages are principally bargained, since the loss in prot from discriminating in the high skilled sector may surpass the gain from discriminating in the low skilled sector. All in all, the key dierence between wage posting and wage bargaining is that the ex post wage now exogenously pegs on the productivity, and rms can no longer manipulate their market power by translating their discriminatory preference into constantly lower wages.
Discussion
Free entry. LMD (2005) have shown that their economy under discrimination with workers' identical in productivity can be generalized to take into account rms' free entry. Specically, we consider a stage where rms sink capital after observing workers' skills. Each rm has dierent capital cost with C 1 < C 2 < ... < C M < y L . Then rms which earn expected non-positive prots after the reduction of capital cost would simply not enter into the market. In the paper, we observe that the equilibrium is unique with respect to β, which has a one-one relationship with M -the number of rms in the market, so that the results in the paper could carry through with free entry. All rms in the market expect positive net prots. When there are dierent skill groups, this result could also carry through, because the equilibrium prot of rms is still an increasing function of β.
Heterogeneity in skill investment cost. Some preliminary attempts from us suggest that our context could be generalized to a situation where workers are heterogenous in their skill investment cost (although more complicated): let the low skill investment cost be zero (E L = 0) for all workers, and the high skill investment cost be, for simplicity, of two values E H,1 < E H,2 ; there are still two levels of productivity: y L and y H . Focus on the correspondingβ and dene it asβ = log y H −y L E H,2 −E L . If the contracts can be contingent on E H,1 and E H,2 , the submarkets for type E H,1 workers and type E H,2 workers are separated, and all the results in the paper carry through for the workers of cost E H,2 ; as for the workers of cost E H,1 , their skill investment cost is lower, hence they have stronger incentive to remain high skilled; then for values of β close toβ = log y H −y L E H,2 −E L , some equilibrium which exists in the E H,2 submarket may not exist in the E H,1 submarket. If the contracts can not be contingent on E H,1 and E H,2 , both type E H,1 and type E H,2 are in the same market and will compete; as a result, there may exist a region of β where both high skilled group a and group b, as well as both low skilled group a and group b, exist at the same time. The extent of the skill investment game is in turn larger, because, for example, a particular group a, E H,1 's skill investment decision should be a best response of other groups: a, E H,2 , b, E H,1 , and b, E H,2 . If heterogeneity in skill investment cost is managed, it is possible to extend the model to multiple skill levels. Shi (2006) shows that in such a model with multiple skill levels free of discrimination, the result that rms always rank the high skilled workers in priority to the workers with lower skills can be generalized. The diculty under the context with discrimination, as just stated, is on the extent of the game.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study a holdup problem where rms can use discriminatory hiring norms to extract higher than socially optimal prots. We nd that when rms rank workers according to both productivitydependent and productivity-independent characteristics, skill investment becomes strategic between the discriminated and the favored group. In case wages are posted, we suggest that depending on the market tightness there may be equilibrium or multiple equilibria on skill investment; in some equilibrium the discriminated group can obtain higher expected payo compared to the case without discrimination 12 and rms can be worse o. We also consider xed sharing rule (bargained wage) and make a comparison. Similar equilibrium, where favored group underinvest while the discriminated group remain high skilled, exists; however, the discriminated group are in general worse o compared to the case without discrimination in the sense that they may still choose to underinvest when ψ is suciently high. Firms' prots are piecewise monotone because the skill composition hence the average productivity of the market improves discretely with respect to the bargaining power, and prot loss may be incurred with discrimination within an intermediate range of bargaining power.
i is one. Generalising, if k =k, which happens with probability Ck N −1 × θ j k 1 − θ j N −1−k , then this job seeker i will be chosen with probability 1 k+1 , because the rm j hask + 1 candidates at disposal.
The employment probability for the workers is
k+1 . This expression could be simplied to
Hence the job seeker's expected pay o is (i) when 0 < β ≤β, the unique equilibrium is such that all job seekers choose high skill, i.e. α * = 1.
A2. Proofs of propositions
(ii) when β >β, the equilibrium consists of a unique value α * ∈ (0, 1) which satises y H −y L E H −E L = e α * β . (iii) when y H −y L E H −E L ≤ 1 such that y H −y L E H −E L = eβ has no positive solution onβ, the unique equilibrium is α * = 0.
Proof. We will prove only case (i) while the proof of case (ii) and (iii) are highly similar. Notice rst
We prove rstly that the deviation to low skill is not optimal. By this, we prove that a proportion of workers' deviating to low skill is suboptimal. And it suces to show that after deviation, the deviator can not get higher expected payo. Before deviation, the expected payo is e −q * H y H − E H , where q * H = β. After deviation, the expected payo becomes e −q D
However, under the condition e −β y H − E H ≥ e −β y L − E L , the expected payo after deviation is weakly lower.
For the uniqueness. We should furthermore show that for the case of α = 0 and α ∈ (0, 1), there will be protable deviation. When α = 0, the expected payo from search is e −β y L − E L . If there is a fraction deviating to high skill, then the expected income for the deviator becomes e − β (y H − y L ) + e −β y L − E H . 
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Then this expected payo after deviation is greater than the expected payo before deviation because.
So the deviation is protable for the deviators. When α ∈ (0, 1), the expected income from search is e −β y L − E L for the low skilled, and e −αβ (y H − y L ) + e −β y L − E H for the type H job seekers, whereα should be pinned down by workers' indierence condition e −αβ (y H − y L ) = E H −E L . However, this condition is incompatible for any α < 1 with our condition e −β y H −E H ≥ e −β y L −E L .
So that it is impossible that job seekers are indierent from being high or low skilled.
All in all, we have proved that when the conguration of parameters is such that e −β y H − E H > e −β y L − E L , the only equilibrium is all the job seekers choose to obtain high skill, i.e. α * = 1. Q.E.D. Proposition 2. The equilibrium labor allocation and skill investment choice are socially optimal.
Proof. We derive the proof for Notion 2, the proof for Notion 1 can be analogously derived. By denition of q, we have q H = N H M and q L = N L M -all rms will attract both skill types. Since N H = αN and N L = (1 − α) N , we have q H = αβ and q L = (1 − α) β. When α = 1 or α = 0, there is only one skill level present in the market; when α ∈ (0, 1), there are both high and low skilled. Dene a priority rule R ∈ [0, 1], which is the probability of choosing high skilled job applicants when both high and low skilled are present in the same rm. The planner chooses α, which hence determines q H and q L , to maximize the aggregate
The objective program can be rearranged to the following way
Whenever we are with corner solutions on α, i.e. q H = 0 or q L = 0, the expression does not depend on R. When the solution on α is interior, q H and q L are both positive. And if we maximize with respect to R, we have (1 − e −q H ) (1 − e −q L ) (y H − y L ) > 0, so that setting R p = 1 is the optimal choice. By doing so, we could further reduce the objective to
Now the derivative with respect to α yields
where the rst line represents the marginal gain from assigning 1% more workers to the high skilled section, and the second line represents the corresponding marginal loss. For values of β such that the marginal gain surpasses the marginal loss, the planner will set α = 1, in which case a thresholdβ p is determined by eβ p (y H − y L ) = E H − E L , such that for values of β not larger than this threshold pinned down by the log-return to skills, the planner nds socially optimal to assign all workers to the high skilled sector. When the skill to return is such that (y H − y L ) < E H − E L , for all values of β the marginal gain will be lower than the marginal loss, the planner will choose α p = 0. At last if β satises β >β p , such that the log-return to skill investment is not high enough to oset the market competition (captured by β), there is an α p ∈ (0, 1) (an interior solution) which is determined by e −α p β (y H − y L ) = E H − E L such that the planner will recommend ex ante identical workers to randomize on skill choice and a fraction α p will end up high skilled. It is straightforward to notice that the correspond values of q p H = α p β and q p L = (1 − α p ) β correspond to the equilibrium allocation.
As a summary, we have shown that the threshold for skill investmentβ p coincides withβ, and α p conincides with α * . Q.E.D. Proposition 3: Under the above assumptions, there exist two thresholdsβ 2 andβ 1 with 0 <β 2 <β 1 <β, such that (1) When 0 < β <β 2 , there exists a unique equilibrium in which both group a and group b invest in high skill, (aH, bH). At β =β 2 , both (aH, bH) and (aH, bL) can be equilibrium.
Proof. Holding group b high skilled, group a's best response depends on the comparison between U P 1 aH (β) and U P 3 aL (β). On one hand, since q P 1 aH (β) > β, we have where the last inequality is due to the fact that e −β y H − E H ≥ e −β y L − E L for all β ≤β and q P 4 aH > β, implying that choosing high skill is a dominant strategy for group a when group b choose low skill.
Holding group a high skilled, group b's best response depends on the comparison between U P 1 bH and U P 2 bL .
On one hand, we have where the rst inequality is due to the fact that 1−e −q P 1 bH (β) q P 1 bH (β) e −q P 1 aH (β) < e −q P 1 aH (β) and q P 1 aH (β) > β. On the other hand, since q P 1 aH (β) and q P 1 bH (β) are increasing in β, when β → 0, we have U P 1 bH (β) → y H − E H which is greater than U P 2 bL (0) = y L − E L . Due to the continuity of U P 1 bH (β) and U P 2 bL (β) on β, there exists at least oneβ 2 <β such that U P 1 Corollary. Compared to the case without discrimination, (1) In (aH, bH) equilibrium, rms always earn higher expected prots; in In (aH, bL) equilibrium and (aL, bH), rms earn lower expected prots.
(2) In (aH, bH) equilibrium, both aH and bH workers earn lower expected payo; in (aH, bL) equilibrium, group aH (group bL) earn higher (lower) expected payo; in (aL, bH) equilibrium, group bH (group aL) earn higher (lower) expected payo. skilled, group a choose to be low skilled, because ψ <ψ bL,a . Holding group a high skilled, group b choose to low skilled, because ψ <ψ bL,a <ψ aH,b . Holding group a low skilled, group b choose to be high skilled, because ψ >ψ aL,b . At the point ψ =ψ bL,a , the unique equilibrium is (aH, bL). (4) We prove for values of ψ ∈ ψ bL,a ,ψ aH,b , there is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (aH, bL).
Holding group b high skilled, group a choose to be high skilled, because ψ >ψ bH,a . Holding group b low skilled, group a choose to be high skilled, because ψ >ψ bL,a . Holding group a high skilled, group b choose to low skilled, because ψ <ψ aH,b . Holding group a low skilled, group b choose to be high skilled, because ψ >ψ aL,b . At the point ψ =ψ aH,b , the equilibrium can be (aH, bL) or (aH, bH). (5) We prove for values of ψ ∈ ψ aH,b , 1 , there is a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium (aH, bH). Holding group b high skilled, group a choose to be high skilled. Holding group b low skilled, group a choose to be high skilled. Holding group a high skilled, group b choose to high skilled, because ψ <ψ aH,b . Holding group a low skilled, group b choose to be high skilled, because ψ >ψ aL,b . 
